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This is the report of a Hearing of the LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe 
that took place at the LSE on the 1 March 2016. Participants were invited based on their 
knowledge, expertise and experience of British foreign and security policy (including 
foreign economic and trade policy). The focus of the Hearing was the impact on British 
foreign policy of a possible Brexit. A secondary area of discussion centred on the 
consequences of Brexit on EU external relations.
We are extremely grateful for the insightful contributions by the participants during 
the hearing. We extend special thanks to Lord Christopher Tugendhat and Professor 
Christopher Hill for their introductory remarks, which set the scene for the general 
discussion. This report is based on the ensuing discussion. None of the views or conclusions 
included in this report may be attributed to a single individual listed in the participant list. 
They are rather the summary views and conclusions drawn from the collective discussion. 
   Foreword
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1. Introduction
Experts from the UK and other EU member states discussed the effects of a possible Brexit 
on British foreign policy and European security. The discussions were structured around 
the themes of sovereignty, diplomacy, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, its 
Security and Defence Policy and trade. 
There was wide agreement among participants that the pursuit of de jure sovereignty 
would not result in greater autonomy or a greater role of Britain in international affairs. 
Leaving the EU is likely to have strong effects on the UK’s ability to engage with its closest 
diplomatic partners and on the structure of the Western Alliance with the United States. 
Decreased power would become particularly evident in the UK’s ability to influence EU 
Foreign Policy.  While it would still be able to cooperate with the EU on foreign affairs,  
its influence would be considerably diminished on short and long-term developments.  
The effects on the relationship between NATO and the EU would also be significant, as a 
Brexit may change the dynamics of cooperation between NATO and the EU. Finally, trade 
would be significantly affected and require significant UK renegotiation for market access 
with key partners.
2.   Summary
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•  The distinction between de jure 
sovereignty (the formal right to make 
decisions) and de facto sovereignty (the 
availability of choices and the restricted 
or untrammelled ability of a state to 
choose) is crucial.
•  The UK would be a less attractive 
foreign policy partner outside the 
EU after Brexit – including for the 
United States. The Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) provides an 
invaluable ‘diplomatic alliance’ for 
the UK. Britain outside the EU would 
complicate policy on security and 
terrorism issues.
•  In the long-term, Brexit would be 
interpreted as a signal of disunity among 
the Western allies, and in the short-term 
Brexit would have a negative impact  
on the EU’s CSDP capacity.
•  Most EU decisions remain within 
member state competence, though 
many initiatives are on a bilateral or 
mini-lateral basis, so are not directly  
EU concerns.
•  The UK would have to renegotiate 
many of the trade arrangements with 
third countries and risk losing access  
to markets and reintroduction of  
trade barriers. 
•  The UK would remain an influential 
voice outside the EU, especially in 
financial matters, though in trade  
and investment its bargaining power 
would be weaker. 
•  The essential intergovernmentalism of 
CFSP and Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) could lend itself to post-
Brexit bilateral arrangements, though 
in CFSP implementation of many 
operations lies with the Commission, 
even if co-operation/co-ordination 
between the UK and the Commission 
could conceivably be maintained and 
replicated after Brexit.
•  The execution of CSDP falls almost 
exclusively to the member states, 
rather than EU institutions such as the 
Commission.
•  Aid is a long-standing EU foreign policy 
instrument, regarded as a European 
success in which the UK has played a 
significant role. 
•  Trade matters are often discussed in 
traditional terms of tariffs and physical 
barriers, but international trade 
negotiations increasingly focus on 
market access and regulatory issues.
•  UK membership of the WTO is an 
unlikely viable alternative to EU 
membership.
•  After Brexit, the UK would become a 
rule-taker instead of rule-maker.
•  There is no guarantee that the UK 
would pursue a more open trade policy 
outside the EU and the Single Market.
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3.  Sovereignty and Power in  
International Relations
There is broad agreement that the current 
debate about sovereignty is really a 
chimera. Sovereignty does not readily 
translate into flexibility and power in terms 
of foreign and security policy, though it 
is helpful to remember the well-known 
distinction between de jure sovereignty 
(the formal right to make decisions) and 
de facto sovereignty (the availability of 
choices and the restricted or untrammelled 
ability of a state to choose). Brexit might 
not affect the UK’s ability to select its 
friends and partners independently of EU 
policy constraints, but it might well reduce 
the UK’s attractiveness as a diplomatic 
interlocutor, foreign policy ‘ally’ and 
commercial partner and, therefore, the 
practical availability of choices. The UK, 
outside the EU, would have to work hard 
to forge cooperative agreements and 
implement whatever policies emerged 
from the domestic arena. Importantly, 
it is economic and political power that 
counts, so whether the UK would be 
more powerful outside the EU is the 
crucial question, with the UK’s ability to 
project that power essential to drawing 
relevant conclusions for political strategy. 
Nonetheless, the public’s concerns about 
sovereignty are clearly important.  
The loss, confirmed by successive EU 
treaties, of full formal sovereignty parallels 
an increased public sense of impotence, 
creating anxiety, further encouraged by 
arguably biased media and ‘project fear’. 
Some participants argued that a pro-
EU referendum outcome might actually 
encourage the UK government to boost 
commitment to integration, of course 
within the terms of the 2016 negotiation. 
Yet, deep-rooted Euroscepticism might 
well continue to weaken the UK’s freedom 
of action in many fields. 
Much of the debate on Brexit has been 
framed in terms of sovereignty (see 
Glendenning report page 7). This has 
clouded fundamental issues of foreign 
and security policy and international trade 
relations. Sovereignty does not necessarily 
equate with power and flexibility in 
political and commercial terms, and even in 
the security/defence nexus if Brexit implied 
autonomy of action for the UK, this would 
albeit be circumscribed by historical and 
geostrategic imperatives and a modified 
relationship with the US. 
it is economic and political 
power that counts, so whether 
the UK would be more 
powerful outside the EU  
is the crucial question
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There was concern at the tendency to 
consider foreign policy in a vacuum, 
ignoring its comprehensive nature and  
its varied expertise and instruments.  
Brexit would probably have less impact  
on foreign and security policy than on 
other issues in the broader debate.  
Most decisions in these areas remain  
within member state competence and 
many initiatives take place on a bilateral  
or mini-lateral basis. This could imply a 
later return to bilateral relations with 
erstwhile EU partners in the domain 
of foreign policy. It might make for a 
complicated agenda, difficult to manage  
if the UK were constrained to renegotiate 
a series of arrangements with EU member 
states.  Yet, while the EU’s main forum for 
foreign and security policy, the CFSP, might 
not be considered an outstanding success 
from a UK perspective, it is nonetheless 
part of a vital ‘diplomatic alliance’ for the 
UK; an alliance requiring re-invention were 
the UK to exclude itself or be excluded. 
The UK would have to rely on goodwill 
and short-term arrangements. It would be 
a ‘demandeur’ with respect to CFSP and 
the major European actors within it. 
A UK outside the EU might be able to align 
itself with a decision made by EU member 
states in the CFSP context, but alignment 
as a non-member with the Commission 
in terms of execution/implementation 
would be more difficult and clearly less 
effective. The administrative and decision-
making implications of Brexit in foreign 
policy terms are thus crucial. In addition 
to losing access to key EU institutions 
and European foreign policy networks, 
the UK might initially struggle to build 
up the administrative and policy-making 
capacities to pursue an independent 
foreign policy in an ever increasingly 
complex international system, a point 
linked with the fact that most areas of EU 
policy are now deemed domestic policy. 
Such ‘domestic’ policies, albeit negotiated 
and coordinated in the EU framework, 
would fall after Brexit into the domain of 
foreign policy, thus adding a bureaucratic 
and administrative burden for which the 
UK may currently be unprepared, not least 
in terms of staff and training. These are 
not insurmountable issues, but they would 
require an extensive recruitment drive and 
training programme.
4. Foreign Policy
alignment as a non-member 
with the Commission in terms 
of execution/implementation 
would be more difficult and 
clearly less effective
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5. CFSP
In matters of foreign policy and security, 
the stark question arising from British 
withdrawal from the EU concerns whether 
the EU would be a serious actor on the 
world stage without the UK.  Many regard 
the UK as an indispensable part of the 
EU’s global strategic voice. The chances of 
the EU being a third pole in international 
relations would clearly be diminished 
without the UK.   Without the UK, the EU 
would likely become less interventionist in 
international conflicts.  Its ability to work 
within the framework of the Responsibility 
to Protect would be seriously undermined.
It is true that there is frustration in the 
UK and other member states, about the 
seeming inability of the EU to act as a 
unitary whole. Even at the UN the EU often 
amounts to less than the sum of its parts. 
It punches beneath its weight, and this 
explains why some member states have 
resorted to unilateral or mini-lateral action 
within and outside the EU framework, 
reinforcing the idea of sovereign flexibility 
of action. Would the UK be able to assume 
a pivotal position in world politics outside 
the EU? One fear is that third powers 
would accord it less importance than to 
the EU as a whole or other individual 
EU member states. In fact, the UK is not 
always a necessary guest at the table.  
The EU’s response to the Russian 
intervention in Ukraine is a case in 
point. The UK remained on the sidelines, 
watching German diplomacy lead the 
discussion with Russia.
Although it is not often recognised, the  
UK has been a strong supporter of the  
EU’s common foreign and security  
policy (CFSP). Indeed, many of the EU’s 
foreign policy successes can be attributed 
to British actions and suggestions.  
Moreover, it is difficult to identify any 
recent foreign policy issue in which the 
EU went ahead against the wishes of the 
British government. Instead, the UK has 
often leveraged the EU for its own foreign 
policy benefit. The British have notched 
up a number of successes in this respect: 
the Serbia-Kosovo agreement; the Iran 
deal; dealing with Somalia; and sanctions 
against Burma. It has also favoured a 
common EU approach on sanctions against 
Russia; human rights in China; and peace-
brokering over Cyprus.  British diplomats, 
like Catherine Ashton and Robert Cooper, 
have had significant personal influence.  
During a prolonged period of Brexit 
negotiation, the UK would be distracted.  
It would be less able to play a part in world 
affairs. Moreover, both the U.S. President 
and more recently President Xi of China 
have indicated that Britain would be less 
influential on the global stage if it were 
outside the EU.
Would the UK be able to 
assume a pivotal position in 
world politics outside the EU? 
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CSDP is arguably ‘a dead duck’ with 
enormous potential for revival. In terms 
of CSDP and general security concerns the 
short-term consequences of Brexit would 
be less problematic than other policy areas 
for both the UK and the EU. CSDP has 
not lived up to expectations in military 
terms. Some missions have proved of 
limited use, but the Battlegroup concept 
has not been markedly significant. It, like 
many other areas, is a work in progress. 
If the essential intergovernmentalism of 
CSDP could easily lend itself to post-Brexit 
bilateral arrangements, unlike in CFSP, 
implementation and execution of CSDP 
falls almost exclusively to the member 
states, rather than EU institutions such as 
the Commission. So the UK leaving the 
Union would have a greater negative 
impact on the EU’s CSDP capacity than on 
UK defence policy and its ability to act 
independently. British military capabilities 
and experience are a vital ingredient in 
the CSDP and it would not be difficult 
to envisage the UK opting into CSDP 
missions, as has already happened in other 
cases. Underlying all this is the fact that in 
defence terms the EU lives in the shadow 
of NATO. This will remain central to the 
UK’s defence and security policy and to 
CSDP, which relies on NATO in terms of 
planning and capabilities.
However, some have emphasised that 
the long-term impact on the Western 
Alliance could be disastrous. First, Brexit is 
a major worry for Europe’s most important 
partner, the United States, for it could be 
interpreted as a signal of disunity among 
the Western allies, potentially exploitable 
by adversaries. Second, the EU would 
lose one of its most important building 
blocks for the development of a strong 
European presence within the Western 
Alliance. Outside the EU, the UK might 
develop an interest in having the most 
important decisions taken in NATO rather 
than in the EU, and this could undermine 
the European effort to build up its own 
capabilities and capacity to act. It may  
also significantly affect the bilateral 
security efforts of France and the 
UK. France considers collaboration 
within the PSC on security essential 
for this relationship. Thus, moving this 
collaboration fully outside the EU might 
weaken the alliance and result in new 
tensions, given the uncertainty of the 
United States’ commitment to European 
security. In the medium and long-term 
Europe will have no choice but to take 
on more responsibilities in its Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhood, even if Brexit 
might rob CSDP of much of its potential 
capabilities. The UK has obstructed 
further integration on security in recent 
years; and there is a strong argument 
for Germany therefore to step up; the 
implication potentially being more effort 
6.  Security and Defence Policy
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put into building the strong foreign policy 
institutions that the UK government, 
avoiding the criticism of a supposed 
“European army,” has so far restrained. 
The ability of the UK to influence these 
developments would be severely limited 
outside of the EU.
As to the UK’s role in CSDP, it does not rely 
as much on CSDP in pursuit of defence 
goals. NATO would clearly remain a far 
more important locus of action. But Brexit 
could seriously harm the CSDP and the EU 
as a security actor, potentially questioning 
the US commitment to European security 
at a time of uncertainty and tension, not 
least in the European neighbourhood. 
Britain would remain relevant in defence 
terms after Brexit, but could be diminished 
in importance as it loses its influence in 
European policy-making. 
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The field of development aid is different, 
however. Aid is a long-standing EU  
foreign policy instrument, regarded as  
a European success in which the UK has  
played a significant role. The EU is in  
fact a multiplier of activity, and there  
is much co-operation/co-ordination  
between individual member-states and  
the Commission. This could be maintained  
and replicated after a Brexit, although 
it would add significantly to the UK’s 
administrative burden mentioned above. 
In sum, though, from a funding perspective 
‘the EU would miss DFID more than DFID 
would miss the EU’.
7.  Development Policy
Picture: Simon Davis/DFID
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8.  Trade 
Some are concerned about the terms 
in which the UK’s role as a trade power 
is currently discussed. There are two 
aspects to this concern. First, the issue 
is a subset of wider geostrategic issues. 
Second, trade matters are generally 
discussed in traditional terms of tariffs and 
physical barriers. Yet, international trade 
negotiations nowadays increasingly focus 
on market access and regulatory issues. 
Some point out that if the UK were to 
leave the EU, it would have to start from 
square one to renegotiate on a bilateral 
basis with many third countries in order 
to secure, or at least confirm, essentially 
the same benefits it already enjoys under 
existing EU trade agreements. Most trade 
liberalisation since the early 1990s has 
been achieved not directly under the 
auspices of the WTO, but through a large 
number of bilateral and multilateral 
Preferential Trade Agreements governing 
and increasing access to markets. The 
two currently most prominent of these 
agreements, both involving the EU, are 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) with the United States 
and the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement with Canada. 
Thus, when supporters of Brexit highlight 
the ability of the UK to remain a WTO 
member after Brexit, it is nonetheless 
questionable whether the UK’s 
membership in the WTO represents a 
viable alternative to EU membership.  
The real cost of Brexit might prove the loss 
of unimpeded access to many international 
markets and the (likely) reintroduction 
of trade barriers against the UK, at least 
until newly negotiated deals emerge. 
The UK would still be an influential 
voice, especially on matters of financial 
regulation. On trade and investment, 
however, its bargaining power is likely 
to be diminished. Third countries would 
probably hesitate to strike independent 
trade deals with the UK, especially given 
large-scale trade negotiations can last 
several years. The TTIP negotiations  
already indicate the U.S. would probably 
not be willing to invest diplomatic effort 
and resources into renegotiating a parallel 
deal with the UK. In short, there is concern 
that, in the event of Brexit, the UK would 
be obliged to become a rule-taker instead 
of rule-maker, and there is no guarantee 
that the UK will pursue a more open  
trade policy outside the EU and the  
Single Market. 
Although it is likely the UK would continue 
to apply the EU’s common external 
tariff, there would likely be pressures on 
government to increase protection in 
various sectors. There are in fact numerous 
uncertainties in terms of international 
trade arising from a possible Brexit, 
not least the implication of having to 
renegotiate numerous agreements, over a 
long period of time, with no guarantees as 
to the outcome. Britain would likely retain 
a strong voice in financial terms, but its 
influence could be severely diminished in 
more general commercial terms. 
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The EU is more than a set of institutions 
and procedures which some hold to be 
dysfunctional. It is a diplomatic partnership 
almost impossible to replicate. Leaving 
would expose the UK to diminishing 
relevance to friend and rival alike.  
Outside the EU, the UK would need to 
reactivate its bilateral relations with its 
former partners. And while the UK would 
be able to align itself with CFSP decisions, 
providing member states agree, it would 
not have access to EU instruments for 
policy implementation. Indeed, the UK 
might not currently enjoy adequate 
administrative capacity to deal with the 
breadth of foreign policy issues following 
a possible Brexit. In fact, foreign and 
security policy do not figure highly on the 
agenda of the Brexit debate, though trade 
issues are more prominent. Where they do 
figure is usually in terms of principles of 
sovereignty and autonomy of action, and 
then without much or any reflection on 
the practical implications of Brexit and  
the severe uncertainties and limitations 
which life outside the EU would bring.  
If Britain votes ‘no’ in the referendum, 
and thus to leave the EU, the latter will 
not collapse as a direct result. The survival 
of the EU is in the overwhelming interests 
of the other member states; there are no 
strong players in the foreseeable future for 
whom its breakdown would be the highest 
preference. Thus, a British ‘no’ vote creates 
an agenda for the kind of relationship 
the UK will have with a continuing system 
possessing significant economic and 
political clout.   
Brexit appears alongside numerous other 
geopolitical and domestic challenges faced 
by the EU. The rise of domestic terrorism; 
the issues posed by jihadism in the Middle 
East; and Russia’s aggressive policy are each 
a major threat to the EU. Having Britain 
outside the EU would just add pressure and 
complicate the approach to these issues. 
With Britain outside, the EU’s international 
influence would be re-structured.  
The EU would lose its strongest voice in 
Washington, clearly to the detriment of 
European interests.  Indeed, an EU minus 
the UK might be less NATO-friendly and 
more willing to develop separately, much 
to the chagrin of the US.  And Britain is  
the one European power that understands 
the dynamics of East Asian politics.  
The EU will lose an important ally there  
if Brexit occurs.
9.  Conclusions
An EU minus the UK might be 
less NATO-friendly and more 
willing to develop separately, 
much to the chagrin of the US. 
14 |  Britain as a Global actor after Brexit
First Surname Title
Mr Stephen Booth Co-Director, Open Europe
Dr Fraser Cameron Director, EU Asia Centre
Dr Claire Chick Head of Defence FrancoBritish Council
Sir Brian Crowe Former British Ambassador and former Adviser 
to HR Javier Solana
Dr Oliver Daddow Senior Lecturer, Nottingham Trent University
Prof Geoffrey Edwards Senior Fellow, Emeritus, Reader, Pembroke 
College, Cambridge University 
Prof 
Christopher
Hill Sir Patrick Sheehy Professor of International 
Relations, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge 
University 
Dr Ariella Huff Foreign Affairs Committee Specialist advising on 
the Committee’s current EU inquiry
Mr Michael Johnson Adviser on International Trade Policy
Mr Hans Kundnani Senior Transatlantic Fellow German Marshall 
Fund 
Prof Adam Lazowski Professor Westminster University
Dr Patricia Lewis Research Director, International Security, 
Chatham House
Dr Michael Lloyd Senior Research fellow at the Global Policy
Dr Heidi Maurer Assistant Professor, Maastricht University
Prof 
Christoph
Meyer Professor of European & International Politics, 
KCL
Dr Tim Oliver Dahrendorf Fellow on Europe-North America 
Relations
Dr Karolina Pomorska Assistant Professor, Maastricht University
Prof Karen Smith Professor of International Relations, LSE
  Participants List
15LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe |
First Surname Title
Lord 
Christopher
Tugendhat Member of the House of Lords EU Select 
Committee and also Chairman of its External 
Affairs Sub-Committee, former Vice President  
of the European Commission
Mr Nick Witney Co-Director of European Power Programme, 
ECFR
Prof Stephen Woolcock Associate Professor, International Relations, LSE 
16LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe  |
X xxxx
European
Institute
Contact us with any questions
European Institute
Cowdray House
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
WC2A 2AE
General Enquiries
Email: europeaninstitute@lse.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7955 6839
